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Friends of the JOURNAL will regret to learn that the Reverend Hugh Stevenson Tigner has resigned his office as Associate Editor. On behalf of the readers, the Editors extend hearty thanks to him for his valuable service to the JOURNAL during the first three years of its publication.

We welcome the Reverend Donald B. F. Hoyt as the new Associate Editor representing the Universalist Ministerial Association. Since 1932 Mr. Hoyt has been Minister of All Souls Church in Brattleboro, Vermont. He is secretary and treasurer of the Universalist Ministerial Association, and he compiled the 1941 Lenten Manual for the Universalist Churches.

The Changing Reputation of Human Nature¹

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

"Modern Liberalism, whether political or religious, needs nothing so much as a realistic and credible doctrine of man. We pride ourselves on the open-mindedness of our kind toward all sciences and their findings. But at this particular point most of us have a hereditary or a willful blind spot."

Few things in human history are fixed. Least of all, reputations. As Santayana remarks of Hamlet, the reputations both of the great figures of fiction and of their creators have usually had an evolution and a history. One age extols Shakespeare as abiding our every question, and another devotes itself to "improving" him. One age wishes Milton could be living at this hour; another regards him as the blight of English poesy. One "school" honors Plato as the "father of all orthodoxy;" another excommunicates him as the "source of all heresy." Hence, the admonition, "Let us now praise famous men" raises again and again the questions, Which men? and How praise them?

But not only individual reputations change. The reputation of the whole species also changes. Indeed, it has been changing a good deal of late. The reasons for this are legion. One reason is, of course, that among men above the primitive level some change of outlook is always taking place. It may be slow or devious, but it is inevitable. There is a sort of dialectic in the history of ideas which over and over again manifests itself in a dissatisfaction with "established" views and in a demand for novelty. Moreover, every idea that persists in history has what Hegel calls its own "cunning." No idea can remain static, not even the conception of man. The values and insights of a given orientation or emphasis seem to exhaust themselves, and the moving finger of time points in a new direction,—and sometimes in the opposite direction. Another reason for the change

¹This essay is an expansion of the Berry Street Conference Address delivered in Boston, Mass., at the annual "May Meetings" of the American Unitarian Association, May 21, 1941.

Since the delivery of this address a number of ministers have suggested that when published the paper should provide references to significant literature on the topics discussed.

The epigraph is taken from Dean Sperry's provocative essay, "Liberalism," *Christendom*, V (1940), 185.

in the reputation of man is the fact that many of the generalizations applied to human nature in one period of world history have only a restricted validity in another period. The structure of society at a given time in large measure determines which aspects of human nature shall receive fuller expression and which shall be suppressed or called very little into play.² But there are also reasons for changes in the reputation of human nature which are peculiar to our age. For one thing, both the natural and the social sciences have in the recent past brought forth new knowledge about human nature which is affecting its reputation. Equally significant as a cause for the changes taking place today in this area is the profound change in the whole historical situation. History has its "cunning" too, and this affects man's estimate of the human condition. Hence, the current revolt against the older Liberal estimate of man is partially due to the fact that the so-called Age of Liberalism has culminated in a terrifying crisis.³

This change in the reputation of human nature presents a serious problem for every "established" philosophy. Old and encrusted forms of thought are being subjected to radical criticism. Some of them are being broken and transformed; some are even being replaced by new forms or by revised versions of old forms of thought. In such a situation it is inevitable that the attempted changes should encounter resistance, especially where the "established" philosophy has enjoyed a wide acceptance. For there is in every "established" historical movement a resistance to movement.

This resistance to movement is not necessarily a sign of ossification. Particularly in periods of crisis, prophets always abound who take a melodramatic attitude toward history and toward their own younger selves. These melodramatic prophets urge their fellows to repudiate all the doctrines that have prevailed in the recent past and frequently they offer salvation through a return to the good old days of the Mishpat or of primitive Christianity or

²Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940), for a brilliant exposition of this thesis.

³In view of the fact that the present essay is concerned with certain changes that are taking place or are imminent within religious liberalism, it seems advisable for the sake of clarity to follow the practice of referring to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century philosophy of individualism and progress as Liberalism (with a capital L) and of referring to the ongoing broader movement for the freedom of the Christian mind and conscience in a just order of society as liberalism (with a small l). Both of these types

of the Middle Ages. In the face of these invitations to somersault, resistance may serve a valuable purpose. It may help to give continuity and stability to the processes of history and thus aid an excited generation to resist the temptation simply to pass from one extreme to another.

Just this sort of resistance one might hope will be provided by religious liberalism in a time of stock-taking such as ours. Indeed, if religious liberalism does not fulfill this function today it will in the end be rightly adjudged as the salt that has lost its savour.

But the resistance to change that is found in every historical movement may also serve as an obstruction to the emergence or appreciation of new insights. Liberalism is not unlike other "established" philosophies in this respect. Having enjoyed success for so long, it is now prone to assume glibly that it has "arrived." Hence many liberals today, instead of recognizing the inevitability of change in the reputation of human nature, are inclined to doubt whether the changes they do not like are really significant. They prefer to think that time's wingéd chariot only carries coals to Newcastle. What Professor E. E. Aubrey has characterized as the conservative tendency of reason plays a large role here. Thus the attitude of dogged resistance to change or criticism is often symptomatic of a change that has already taken place imperceptibly and even unconsciously,—the change from a dynamic movement of growth to a static position of defense. Among liberals this sort of resistance is in some instances motivated by the notion that the best interests of liberalism will be threatened if one concedes that it is rightly subject to radical criticism. This kind of resistance appears where liberalism has become an "ideology." Its adherents use, or rather abuse, it to protect some vested intellectual or material interest.

Another type of regressive resistance to movement in liberalism is the sort that arises from the identification of it with some par-

of liberalism, of course, have taken a secular as well as a religious form.

The confusion that obtains with regard to the use of the word "liberalism" is, of course, nothing new. For a brief study of its many meanings in the past and in current usage see Guido de Ruggiero, "Liberalism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 9, 435-441; see also James Truslow Adams, "Liberals," *Dictionary of American History*, Vol. III, 269-270; Willard L. Sperry, *op. cit.*, pp. 181 ff.; John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York, 1935); Frank H. Knight, "Ethics and Economic Reform. I. The Ethics of Liberalism," *Economica*, February, 1939.

ticular doctrines that are believed to be once for all delivered and thus not subject to criticism. This sort of resistance appears where a philosophy has become orthodox, and it plays right into the hands of those critics of liberalism who identify it with some particular doctrine and then, because of the alleged inadequacy of this doctrine, urge us to have done with liberalism of every form. By means of this ruse such critics give the impression that they were right in always having opposed liberalism, and thus they the more easily persuade their adherents that the world should attempt to assuage its guilt by casting its sins upon a scapegoat "constructed" for the purpose, a scapegoat that they call "liberalism."

In the face of this sort of attack the liberals have (as we have suggested) a very significant positive role to play in maintaining resistance, especially in maintaining it against those forces that threaten to destroy the enduring values of liberalism and that lead towards fanaticism, obscurantism, and authoritarianism. Certainly, the religious liberals should protest vigorously against the claim that they must either retain the old Liberalism in its entirety or give up liberalism altogether. They should also insist that such a false statement of the alternatives bespeaks a complete misunderstanding of the nature of liberalism. The modification or abandonment of some particular doctrine of an earlier liberalism is not tantamount to the betrayal of liberalism. Far from it. It may be actually the practice of liberalism.

This fact becomes evident if we consider a pungent criticism of modern Liberalism written by an eminent theologian of our day. Attacking the traditionally over-optimistic doctrine of man in the older Liberalism and at the same time appealing to a liberal principle as the basis for his criticism, this theologian writes:

Turning now to the criticism of Liberalism from within, to which its own creative principle gives rise, we must seriously question whether it can bear the weight of the tragedies of human existence. Does not its amiable faith in inherent goodness appear ghastly mockery when confronted by the facts of life? Believing in the immanent God, it must seriously consider what sort of God it is that nature reveals. We cannot be so enamoured of the loveliness of nature as to be blind to its terrible aspects. And what of human sin? Here more than anywhere else the weakness of Modern Liberalism shows itself. It may be conceded that traditional theology made too much of sin, but surely that was better than to make light of it. To a serious thinker, Modern Liberalism often seems too jocund for life as it actually is. . . . We would not have Modern Liberalism return to a belief

in the devil—that is too easy a solution to the problem—but it must deal more justly with the crushing tragedies of life, with evil and sin, if it is to command the respect of candid and thoughtful men. The saviors of the world have always been and always will be men of sorrow and acquainted with grief.”

This paragraph was not written by an adherent of any one of those groups that are, according to some accounts, today leading a retreat into the “dark backward and abysm” of Calvinism. It was written by a representative Unitarian. Nor was it written by one whose vision was distorted by “post-war pessimism.” It appeared not in the year 1942, but in 1913. And its author was undoubtedly a liberal,—the late William Wallace Fenn of the Harvard Divinity School.⁴

It would be wrong to suppose that Dean Fenn’s criticism stands alone in the literature of liberalism or that his criticism is illiberal in spirit or consequence. It is of the essence of liberalism to criticize itself. Moreover, among religious liberals there is and there has always been a considerable variety of opinion about human nature as well as about many other matters. In other words, although religious liberals have been at one in espousing certain liberal principles, such as freedom of inquiry and freedom of conscience, they have not all brought forth the same ideas in their exercise of these freedoms. Thus we see that the liberal method or attitude is one thing, the specific content of liberalism is another. Hence, the liberal doctrine of man may change while the non-authoritarian method of liberalism remains in fundamental respects the same.⁵ Indeed, if some particular doctrine of man—or of God—held among liberals should be viewed as final in its form of expression and as exempt from criticism or change, the principle of freedom in liberalism would thereby be surrendered. Only if the conception of man or God were altered to an extent requiring a fundamental revision of the liberal method, would liberalism as we cherish it be threatened. In this respect, the method and the

⁴The quotation is taken from Dean Fenn’s article “Modern Liberalism,” *The American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 509-519. Walter Marshall Horton has characterized this article “by a great Unitarian thinker” as “the most incisive criticism of liberalism.” See his *Realistic Theology* (New York, 1934), p. 33.

⁵In his book *The Religious Prospect* (London, 1940), V. A. Demant, the eminent British Anglo-Catholic theologian, has recognized and has succinctly delineated certain of the differences between the method of lib-

content of liberalism are correlative and interdependent. Within these limits, then, both variety and change in the stated doctrines of religious liberalism are at once inevitable and legitimate.

* * *

Two things should strike the attention of any one interested in the changing reputation of human nature. The first is that the reputation of human nature in any epoch or movement is closely associated with a general world-view, and it cannot be understood apart from this world-view. The second is the fact that in modern times the major changes in this reputation represent to a large extent variations on a few very old themes. A novel fundamental idea does not appear often in human thought, whether that thought be concerned with man, nature, or God. Only a few basic rival conceptions are available in any one of these areas of thought, and most of these we have inherited from ancient times.

When the reputation of human nature changes, then, it is almost inevitable that either some variation of the prevalent attitude toward human nature and existence or a new version of a neglected earlier conception should emerge. This latter trend has been taking place in our day. In the very process of assimilating the new knowledge of man that has resulted from the application of modern scientific methods and that has accrued from viewing man in a changed historical situation, many people have been led to a new appreciation of certain earlier estimates of human nature and the human situation.

We now turn our attention to a consideration of three of these basic rival conceptions. Our purpose in presenting these rival conceptions is not merely to provide an orientation for the consideration of the current changes in the reputation of human nature, but also to indicate the relative merits of these conceptions and to draw from such a study an indication of the changes needful in the older Liberal doctrine of man.

In the ancient Greek tradition we find two of these typical
 eralism and its content (or doctrines) at any particular time. It is to be regretted that some of the present-day critics of religious liberalism have not taken into account this distinction between method and content.

It should be noted here that although the religious liberal renounces authoritarianism, he adopts some positive doctrine of authority. Indeed, the conception of the nature of authority as held in earlier liberalism is ripe for re-examination in the light of certain new insights of our day concerning "the seat of authority" in a religious fellowship.

estimates of human nature and the human situation. The one view is associated with the classical philosophers; it is usually called the intellectualistic or rationalistic view, the Apollonian view. According to this view, reason is the masterful principle of creation, and thus the cosmos is a moving shadow of a world of eternal ideas, essences, or forms. Correspondingly, man's primary, distinguishing faculty is his reason, and through it he can release a vitality that will enable him to achieve control of himself and of the human situation by subjecting them to clearly envisaged forms. What is to be especially noted here is the tendency of this intellectualistic view, first, to interpret existence in terms of a rational, unified, harmonious structure, and, second, to exalt the cognitive, non-affective aspects of the human psyche. The conjunction of these two elements leads to a preoccupation with the forms and structures of being and to a "theoretical attitude of distance" which aims at the development of the form and harmony of the Olympian calm. Thus the vitality of nature, man, and history is assumed, and creativity is identified with the operations of reason.

The other view of human nature in the Hellenic tradition interprets existence more in terms of vitality than of form, a vitality that is both creative and destructive, that imbues every form but that also eludes and bursts the bounds of every structure. It is associated with one of the major traditions in popular Greek religion, with certain pre-Socratic philosophers very close to this religious tradition, and in certain respects, with the great tragedians. It has usually been characterized as the Dionysian view. In recent decades this view and certain modern variations of it have been spoken of as "voluntarism."⁶

In general, this view exalts the dynamic aspects of existence; therefore it conceives of man's proper goal as the fulfillment of the life-giving powers inherent in existence. But here the elements of struggle, contradiction, and tragedy rather than the element of

⁶The term "voluntarism" was coined by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in 1883 and was given wide currency by Friedrich Paulsen in his *Introduction to Philosophy* (1st American from 3rd German ed.; New York, 1895). In its more general meaning it denotes any theory that asserts that will or creativity is the decisive factor in human nature and that will is the ultimate constituent of reality. Perhaps the most widely familiar statement of the position is the assertion of the primacy of the will over the intellect.

As an epistemological method voluntarism may be said to depend upon the view that the substantial character of reality cannot be

harmony is emphasized. Thus in popular Greek thought and even among certain of the élite, a large place is assigned to Fate. Man is believed to be confronted by divine and demonic forces that either support and inspire, or thwart and pervert him in his attempt to fulfill his destiny. Although there is here a keen sense of tragedy, man does not in this view necessarily lose his dignity and worth. Quite the contrary. In the great Greek tragedies, for example, the tragic element is discovered at the very point at which human greatness and the divine sphere come into conflict. It is precisely human greatness that makes possible tragic guilt and self-destruction. Indeed, according to this view, not only man is plagued by a Fate that drives him to tragic grandeur and self-destruction, but even the gods are subject to it, since no one of them can be identified with the highest principle. Fate is considered to be sovereign over both man and the gods just because it is viewed as a causal manifestation of a primordial creative principle. The point to be stressed, however, is that man is here understood in

understood merely by achieving clear and distinct ideas. For reality should determine the ideas and not the ideas the reality. Hence, scientific positivism as well as modern philosophical realism belongs within the tradition of voluntarism, though certain types of rationalistic positivism have veered away from it. Another way of stating this epistemological principle is to say that epistemology must have an ontological basis in the creativity that characterizes "the living universe." Hence, knowledge is an active understanding and a participation in creativity.

The use of the term "voluntarism" in psychology does not connote an acceptance of the old faculty psychology. The word "will" has to a great extent disappeared from the psychology textbooks except in the discussions of the freedom of the will. The words conation, striving, impulse, desire, and action have largely replaced it. The word "will" is used in the present essay to refer to the function or group of functions of the individual or the group as it manifests itself in action. Cf. "Will," *Dictionary of Psychology*, ed. Howard C. Warren (Boston, 1934). For an exposition of certain aspects of voluntaristic psychology since Nietzsche, see the valuable study by Dr. Erich Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love," *Psychiatry*, II (November, 1939), 507-523.

In recent decades the term voluntarism has sometimes been employed by sociologists to denote an emphasis upon the decisive significance of "the social will" in the development of society. For a survey of modern European and American voluntaristic sociology see Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1915), pp. 437-505; also, Ernst Troeltsch, *Historismus und seine Probleme* (Tübingen, 1922); Edward H. Redman, "A Study of Ernst Troeltsch's Theory of Historicism" (Unpublished B.D. dissertation, The Meadville Theological School, 1941).

The term "voluntarism" also denotes any theory that stresses the role of the will or of decision in religious knowledge, in faith, and in religious experience. The Pauline and Augustinian doctrines of grace may be taken as illustrations of a voluntaristic theology and psychology. In the Augustinian tradition, especially in the Middle Ages, the voluntaristic atti-

terms of the dignity and fate of a human agent confronted by a will or power that cannot be created or controlled by any merely rational technique.⁷ The tragic process is master of all forms, causing them to undergo change and transformation and even destruction.

This tragic view of the human condition, as it was held among the Greeks, was largely ignored in eighteenth and nineteenth-century "Hellenism," as was also the fact of its affinity with ancient Hebrew conceptions. The Hellenism that has been influential since the Renaissance has taken its nourishment chiefly from the intellectualistic tendency in Greek life and thought.⁸ Nietzsche and Burckhardt were among the first influential modern historians to become aware of the great significance of the tragic, Dionysian tendency in Greek thought.⁹ The work of later scholars like Butcher and Diels has contributed much to the achievement of

tude toward religious experience is expressed in the view that blessedness is a state of activity. For a recent discussion of the points at issue between certain types of intellectualism and voluntarism in current theological controversy over the Augustinian theology, see Harris Harbison's article, "Will versus Reason," in *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, IX (November, 1941), 203-216. Cf. also on this whole problem, Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York, 1936); H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation* (New York, 1941).

For a history of voluntarism in Germany since the Renaissance, see the valuable work by the distinguished religious liberal, Kurt Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes* (Berlin, 1932). On Leese's philosophy, see James L. Adams, "Kurt Leese and German Liberalism," *The Christian Register*, 116 (August 5, 1937), 463-465.

For a brief history of the various types of voluntarism and of the struggle between intellectualism and voluntarism in European philosophy and theology, see Heinz Heimsoeth, *Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik* (Berlin-Steglitz, 1934), chapter VI. Cf. also "Voluntarism," *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York, 1942.)

⁷On the Greek views of tragedy see Gilbert Norwood, *Greek Tragedy* (Boston, 1920); Prosser Hall Frye, *Romance and Tragedy* (Boston, 1922); article, "Moirai," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Vol. XV (1932), 2449-2472.

⁸It must be noted, however, that during both the Renaissance and the Romantic period there was considerable conflict among the Hellenizers, that is, between the rationalists and those who held the tragic view. But despite the revival of certain elements of the Greek tragic view in Romanticism, the intellectualistic view of Hellenism was the more influential in the nineteenth century, as, for example, in Hegel and Matthew Arnold. Both these writers, despite fundamental divergencies, conceive of Hellenism as an aesthetic, harmonious outlook rather than as a "tragic" one.

⁹See Nietzsche's essays *The Birth of Tragedy* (1870-1) and *Philosophy during the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (1873). For a brilliant characterization of the Apollonian and the Dionysian tendencies in ancient Greek culture, see also Charles W. Morris, *Paths of Life* (Harper, 1942).

a new appreciation of what Butcher has characterized as "the melancholy of the Greeks." Nevertheless, the "Apollonian" interpretation of Hellenism as set forth by Matthew Arnold has continued to exercise a wide influence, and it has veiled from the eyes of many the predominantly tragic attitude of the Greeks, an attitude much more similar to that of the Hebrews than Arnold recognized. The Hellenism described by Arnold deserves the praise he bestows upon it. But we should bear in mind that it was shared by only a small élite in ancient Greece and also that it was only for a short time able to maintain the optimistic attitude that we associate with the glory that was Greece.

In the light of what has been said, it should be clear that we cannot properly understand the third influential attitude toward man and existence—the Judeo-Christian view—if we interpret it as constituting a complete contrast with "the Greek view of life." It is true that there is little in common between the Jewish-and-early-Christian view and the Apollonian attitude. In so far as Matthew Arnold confines attention to these two points of view he is a reliable guide when he characterizes the differences between Hellenism and Hebraism. Also, in addition to the differences that Arnold describes, we should note that another difference between the Judeo-Christian and the sophisticated Greek outlook is to be discerned in their contrasting views of time and history, the one looking upon history as "forward-moving" toward an End (*eschaton*) and the other viewing it as "cyclic."

On the other hand, the Greek Dionysian view and the Judeo-Christian attitude bear a resemblance to each other in their possession of a "tragic sense of life" as well as in their emphasis upon the dynamic elements in the world and in human life. According to the Judeo-Christian view, God is a righteous will fulfilling his purpose in history; man and nature are fallen; man's natural will is at variance with the divine will, and man's sin and guilt and his conflict with the principalities and powers of this world are an inextricable part of human experience. Thus in both the Greek tragic view and the Jewish prophetic and primitive Christian outlook there is an awareness of an ontologically as well as psychologically grounded tendency in man to rebellion, perversion, and self-destruction, and thus there is an assertion of the universal guilt of man. Moreover, in both views the attention

is centered upon the dynamic, creative-destructive aspects of existence and upon the affective aspects of the human psyche.

Yet, there are also certain fundamental differences to be observed between the Judeo-Christian and the Greek "tragic" view. Two of these differences may be noted here. The first has to do with the ultimate valuation they place on existence.

The Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation involves the idea that in substance the world is good, for it is God's creation. Nothing in existence is absolutely anti-divine. In order for anything to exist it must have something of the divine in it. *Esse est bonum qua esse*. The Christian confession: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, the Creator of heaven and earth," has this idea as its real import. Even suffering may be a means of grace. Indeed, the Cross is the highest revelation of the character of God, for through it divine providence overcomes sin and death. Likewise, the Pauline belief in original sin is outweighed by the emphasis on providence and the hope of redemption. Thus God is beyond tragedy; and ultimately, existence and history are not tragic.¹⁰ On the other hand, the Greek popular view from pre-Homeric times was unable to find a principle of transcendence beyond the tragedy of existence. This view finds philosophical expression in the famous fragment of Anaximander: "Things perish into those things from which they have their birth, as it is ordained; for they pay to one another the penalty of their injustice according to the order of time." For Anaximander, "the separate existence of things is, so to speak, a wrong, a transgression which they must expiate by their destruction."¹¹ The contrast between Judeo-Christian optimism and the "melancholy" of the Greeks cannot be discussed in further detail here.¹²

¹⁰One is reminded here of Father Tyrrell's statement that Christianity is an ultimate optimism based upon a provisional pessimism. Cf. also Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (New York, 1937).

As J. B. Bury has pointed out, the modern belief in progress represents a rationalized adaptation of the Christian doctrine of providence. H. Richard Niebuhr has suggested that the idea of progress was also implicit in the neo-Calvinist doctrine of providence which became influential after the Great Awakening. Cf. *The Kingdom of God in America*, (Chicago, 1937), p. 192.

¹¹Cf. Eduard Zeller, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, trans. S. F. Alleyne (London, 1881), I, 256.

¹²It must suffice to direct the reader's attention to one of the best treatments of these contrasts in S. H. Butcher's two volumes, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius* (New York, 1893) and *Harvard Lectures on Greek Sub-*

The other major difference between the Judeo-Christian and the Dionysian view concerns their contrasting attitudes toward reason and morality. The Dionysian view was strongly characterized by "enthusiastic" irrationalism and amoralism, defects made familiar to most of us through the diatribes of Euripides against Dionysianism. The Judeo-Christian mentality in its formative period made no virtue of irrationalism and it strongly opposed amoralism. Whether we think of the Old Testament prophets, of the writers of the Wisdom literature, or of the great rabbis of normative Judaism, whether we think of Jesus, of Paul, of the author of the Fourth Gospel, or of the Greek fathers or Augustine—the main line of the Christian tradition—we find no exaltation of irrationalism and we find a great emphasis placed on conformity to the righteous will of God. With respect to the attitude toward reason, it is no accident that the Christian outlook could be merged with Greek theology. It is largely because of this coming together of Judeo-Christian voluntarism and Greek intellectualism that Christianity became the transmitter of much of the best in both the ancient Semitic and the ancient Greek tradition.

Much of the history of thought in the West may in its broader perspectives be interpreted as a history of the combination of, and the tension and interplay between the three attitudes toward existence which we have briefly described. In view of the fact, however, that the *pagan* tragic view was effectually overcome in the Middle Ages,¹³ modern thought about man and existence in the main represents an interplay between only two of these attitudes, the Greek intellectualist and the Judeo-Christian voluntarist view. The views that prevailed in the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance and the Reformation, and even in the periods of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism are to be interpreted as modern developments, combinations, or perversions of motifs already present in these ancient Greek and Hebrew traditions. The

jects (New York, 1904). See also Paul Tillich, "The Meaning of Our Present Historical Existence," *The Hazen Conferences on Student Guidance and Counselling*, 1938, pp. 19-29, and Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man; Human Nature* (New York, 1941), chap. 1.

¹³A fascinating account of this struggle between the pagan idea of Fate and the Christian idea of Providence is to be found in H. R. Patch, *The Tradition of Boethius; A Study of His Importance in Medieval Culture* (New York, 1935). See also E. K. Chambers, *The Mediaeval Stage* (2 vols., Oxford, 1903).

increasingly dominant force in modern Western culture, however, has been the rationalistic tradition. Although intellectualism reached its high points in Thomism, in the Cartesian tradition, and in early eighteenth-century rationalism, and although it met with strong opposition in Romanticism—a form of Dionysianism, it has in many quarters continued to hold its own. To be sure, it has in this process undergone certain transformations. Indeed, its “success” is perhaps due to this very fact. Thus the earlier static rationalism was in the eighteenth century replaced by a dynamic, progressive rationalism that has exercised a considerable variety of influence. This dynamic rationalism is to be seen, for example, in the revolutionary rationalism of the late eighteenth century; it has served as the core of modern bourgeois democracy; and, alongside the influence of empiricism, it has also decisively affected eighteenth and nineteenth century science and technology. This change to a dynamic rationalism took place at the time when the bourgeois man was freeing himself from the feudal system and bringing about in its place the modern industrialist society. This fact has no small bearing on the character that modern rationalism has assumed in its various stages.

Meanwhile, the voluntaristic view has also undergone many changes. Its peregrinations may be roughly identified with the pilgrimage of the Augustinian point of view through its many variations, as in Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, and Luther, and through essential changes, as in Schelling and Nietzsche. A list of the significant figures who in the modern period have in one way or another stressed the role of creative will and conflict rather than of unitary reason and harmony would be long and imposing. Yet it would for the most part include philosophical outlooks that have been sub-dominant in modern thought until recent decades. Some of these thinkers have set forth a basically irrational philosophy, others have stressed the role of the non-rational or the a-logical, and still others have attempted to combine rational or metalogical analysis with a recognition of the decisive role of the will.¹⁴

In general, however, we may say that whereas intellectualism

¹⁴The wide range of interpretation possible here can be suggested if we note that in the list of voluntarists the following thinkers have been included (in addition to those already named in the text): Calvin, Boehme, Pascal,

as a consequence of its having centered attention on the cognitive aspects of human nature has emphasized rational poise, harmony, and "a theoretical attitude of distance," voluntarism, although for the most part insisting upon the basic significance of the intellectual disciplines, has tended to stress the dynamic and contradictory elements in existence and the affective aspects of human nature. Hence, the latter point of view has emphasized what is today called the existential attitude, that is, "an ultimate concern about the meaning of being for us, demanding an attitude of decision."¹⁵ In the light of these contrasts in typology we must interpret the age-old conflict between those who assert the primacy of the intellect and those who assert the primacy of the will. And it must be noted again that the voluntaristic tradition, especially in Christian theology, has stressed the fateful, tragic aspects of human existence. Indeed, in its most extreme forms voluntarism has asserted the arbitrary sovereignty of God and the helpless corruption of human nature, and in secular thought it has asserted the arbitrary sovereignty of some particularist loyalty to tradition, blood, class, or nation.

* * *

The modern development of intellectualism must be understood as a reaction against these extreme forms of voluntarism. In large degree the Renaissance was a revolt against the obscurantism and authoritarianism of the Middle Ages and also against certain forms of earlier voluntarism, (though it must be added that the

Jonathan Edwards, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Marx, James, Babbitt, Dewey, Bergson, Freud, Troeltsch, Otto, Berdyaev, Tillich, Leese, Tennant, Klages, van Holk, and Mannheim.

The distinguished Orientalist Deussen in *Die Philosophie der Bibel* (Leipzig, 1913), pointed out the affinities between this type of thought and that of the Bible. The American Orientalist, Duncan B. MacDonald, has dealt with the same themes in his *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius* (Princeton, 1936), showing the voluntarist elements in the Old Testament.

Modern psychologists have recognized the significance and originality of Augustine for the theory of the primacy of the will in psychology. Even in that Thomist stronghold, the Latin Church, voluntarist influences have been evident not only among the Scotists but also among those deeply influenced by the Bible and modern realism and pragmatism. Especially significant in this respect are the writings of P. Laberthonnière and Maurice Blondel.

¹⁵Cf. Paul Tillich's review of Reinhold Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, in *Christianity and Society*, VI (Spring, 1941), 34.

Renaissance was also voluntaristic in some respects). Likewise, intellectualism in later centuries represents a revolt against the extreme forms of voluntarism found in orthodox Calvinism and Lutheranism.

Indeed, religious liberalism itself can be understood in its proper perspective only when interpreted as an aspect of this opposition. In religious liberalism the rationalistic view of human nature and of the human situation appeared as a revolt against the older forms of authoritarianism, a revolt in the name of the principles of freedom of mind and freedom of conscience. But concomitantly the liberal movement represented also a revolt against the Protestant dogma of the total depravity of human nature, that is, against a depraved, lopsided, rationalized form of the Christian doctrine of original sin. In short, it was a revolt against a voluntarism that had gone to seed.

The Unitarians and their predecessors were among those who were in the vanguard of this revolt against the pessimistic Reformation conception. In opposition to the Calvinist view, and in no small measure utilizing the dialectical powers inherited from Calvinism, the Unitarians asserted that man's possession of the faculty of reason gives him the dignity of a child of God; and they held that by means of this faculty man could eliminate the superstitions and unworthy accretions of the Christian tradition, and bring about both a fulfillment of the human spirit and a return to "pure Christianity."

The fruits of this struggle and of the great humanitarian impulse of the nineteenth century represent no mean cultural accomplishment. This fact can scarcely be over-emphasized. Moreover, contemporary Protestantism owes to religious liberalism the social emphasis that in the past century has been reintroduced into Protestant thought and action.

But, unfortunately, not all the fruits issuing from the new movement were actually intended or expected by its proponents. Nor was the movement able to maintain in the main body of its adherents the prophetic power of its early days. The new intellectualism, which in its early stages was powerfully dynamic, more and more moved in the direction of emphasizing again the cognitive aspects of human nature ("the theoretical attitude of distance") and of thus neglecting the affective side of human nature

and "the attitude of decision."¹⁶ The influence of the scientific method, despite its value in other respects, played no small role in accelerating this tendency.

Perhaps this trend in religious liberalism can best be brought into relief by an illustration drawn from an early phase of its development. At the time of the Great Awakening in the middle of the eighteenth century, there was a sharp division of opinion concerning the value and validity of the "visible upsets of grace" that attended the revivalist movement, a movement that had arisen partially as an attempt to stem the tide of the Enlightenment. Certainly, little can be said in defense of the methods of the revivalist preachers of the time. The significant thing to be noticed, however, is the particular form that the opposition to the new movement took. This opposition to the New Lights was led by Charles Chauncy of the First Church in Boston.¹⁷ Chauncy was justly impatient with the irrational extravagances of the movement. He charged that it was "a plain stubborn Fact, that the Passions have generally in these times, been apply'd to, as though the main Thing in Religion was to throw them into Disturbance." "The plain truth," he insisted, is that "an enlightened Mind, and not raised Affections, ought always to be the Guide of those who call themselves men; and this, in the affairs of religion, as well as other things." "Reasonable beings," he declared, "are not to be guided by passion or affection, even though the Object of it should be God and the things of another world." Chauncy's preference for the restraints of reason as against "raised affections"

¹⁶Other aspects of this revolt and of certain consequences that have not been "favorable to piety" were discussed by Professor Perry Miller in his address on "Individualism and the New England Tradition" at the annual meeting of the Unitarian Ministerial Union at King's Chapel, Boston, Mass., May 18, 1942. This address was published in the Summer 1942 issue of this JOURNAL.

Professor Miller in his essay on "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXXII (1935), 247-300, has shown that the rationalistic revolt against the Calvinist emphasis on the inscrutability of the divine decrees emanating from the will of God, began among the Puritans in early seventeenth-century England and was widely prevalent among the first Puritan divines of New England. Indeed, Jonathan Edwards was the first strictly Calvinist theologian in New England; he looked upon the earlier divines as heretics.

¹⁷See his *Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England* (Boston, 1743). The controversy is well described in the Introduction to C. H. Faust and Thomas H. Johnson, *Jonathan Edwards, Representative Selections* (New York, 1935).

indicates the trend of his thought. He did still believe that some fundamental change of heart and will—a conversion—is necessary for one who would become a Christian, but his own preoccupation and the increasing preference of his age were with more intellectual matters. As time went on man's reason and not the quality of his will was more and more widely assumed to be of primary importance. As one historian has phrased it, regeneration was now felt to be far too big a word to describe the difference that religion should make.¹⁸ No doubt one reason for this change of attitude was the improved social status and the increased security of the people concerned. "Conversion" was more and more relegated to the underprivileged classes, and middle-class Liberalism became increasingly a form of accommodation to the ways of the world. The elapse of a century and a half of capitalism with its concomitant marriage of convenience with "religion" and the rise of new religious and secular forms of protest were required to make these facts plain. But in the long run the increase in the power of the middle class served to replace the idea of the necessity of conversion with another ideal: the formation of a "respectable" type of "religious" and moral character through "reasonable" and increasingly secularistic (and "safe") education.

What was happening here may be taken as characteristic of one important element in the modern movement of rationalism since Descartes. The emphasis on the quality of the will, on the disposition of the *entire* personality, was being replaced by a one-sided emphasis on "reason." The attitude of Greek rationalism as mediated through Stoicism and scholasticism and transformed by modern rationalism, was taking the place of the older Augustinian emphasis on the will and the affections. Here we find, then, the element that has given to Unitarianism its reputation for being intellectual. The appeal to affective experience, the belief in the necessity for conversion, and the use of the emotive symbols of the religious tradition were more and more deprecated.¹⁹ Thus religious Liberalism, in the name of *intellectual* integrity, tended to neglect the deeper levels both of the human consciousness and of reality itself. As a consequence, it gradually became associated

¹⁸W. P. Paterson, *Conversion* (New York, 1940), p. 123.

¹⁹Cf. Gerald Birney Smith, "Liberal Theology," *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, ed. S. Mathews and G. B. Smith (New York, 1921).

with an ascetic attitude toward the imagination as well as toward enthusiasm and gripping loyalties. Instead of confronting men with the demand of inner commitment to the ideals of prophetic religion, it more and more provided a cosmic or religious sanction for the interests of a particular group. In the end "the attitude of distance" won the day, and Liberalism achieved poise by living at the low temperature of "detached, middle-class common sense."²⁰

These tendencies were not the consequence of a loss of faith. They were merely the negative aspects of a new faith. Nor was this a faith merely in human reason or in man alone. It was a faith that found its support in a new idea of the character of the universe and of man as a part of that universe.

This faith and its supporting conception of the universe is what is generally referred to when the modern historian of culture speaks of Liberalism (with a capital L). It is against this type of Liberalism and its contemporary residues that much of the current criticism of religious liberalism is directed. In so far as it is valid this criticism does not involve a repudiation of the liberal ideal of liberating the human spirit from the bondage of economic, social and ecclesiastical tyrannies. It is directed against the view of human nature and of the nature of reality which is explicit in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Liberalism and which is still implicit in much liberal thought of today. Hence, it is directed also against the tendency of this type of Liberalism to become associated too closely with the interests of one class in society. Let us now examine these conceptions.

* * *

Dean Fenn has pointed out that the "favorite concept" of modern rationalistic Liberalism is its belief in the unified structure of the world.²¹ This belief is the modern counterpart

²⁰The "attitude of distance" is, of course, indispensable for both science and religion. But it is scarcely sufficient for religion. In this connection see G. E. O. Meyer's discussion of the I-Thou relationship, "The Religious Socialist in the World Crisis," *THE JOURNAL OF LIBERAL RELIGION*, III (Spring, 1942), 196. Cf. also the Jewish mystic, Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (Edinburgh, 1937); Philip Wheelwright, "Religion and Social Grammar," *Kenyon Review*, IV (Spring, 1942), 202-216; H. Richard Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.

On the religion of the low temperature, and of "detached, middle-class common sense," see A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926), pp. 52 ff.

²¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 517 ff.

of the Greek rationalistic view of ultimate reality as a unified pattern behind phenomena, a pattern which is viewed as the source of vitality and with which the rational soul feels itself akin. It has found a great variety of expression, as in Descartes' faith in the existence of a divine power that harmonizes both mind and nature, or in Spinoza's view that thought and extension are different attributes of the same substance and that God is that substance, or in Leibniz' theory of a pre-established harmony that preserves unity despite apparent diversity, or in his view that the individual is a unified whole within the macrocosm.

We are all familiar with the result of this whole tendency. Because of the pre-established harmony, separative individualism was given a divine sanction, and the modern Liberal's over-optimism concerning human nature and its progressive and ultimate perfectibility was born. Mandeville does, to be sure, recognize the contrast between the selfish desire of the bourgeois man and his desire for order and education. But he resolves the conflict by appealing to the pre-established harmony: hence, he says private vices are public virtues. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson discover a moral sense in everybody. This moral sense, they say, is an invariant norm, the violation of which would alone introduce discord. Helvetius even goes so far as to assert that self-love leads ultimately to the love of others. Condillac says that the brain is a *tabula rasa*, but the laws of matter operative in brain vibrations will bring forth truth. How? Through the pre-established harmony. And many of the scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, following the lead of Francis Bacon, believed that if only the scientists would individually specialize and then pool their findings the kingdom of man would be ushered in. Finally, Liberal economics proclaimed the faith that if markets were made free and state interference were reduced to a minimum, the rationality of economic forces would do the rest and harmonious well-being for everybody would ensue.²² This view was sup-

²²For a discussion of the theory of pre-established harmony and of related ideas, see E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London, 1941), chap. 4. See also J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (rev. ed.; New York, 1940), Bk. III; Wilhelm Pauck, "What Is Wrong with Liberalism?" *The Journal of Religion*, XV (1935), 146-160; Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven, 1932); Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, trans.

ported by the doctrine of the harmony of interests, according to which the individual could be relied on, without external control, to promote the interests of the community for the reason that those interests were identical with his own. The harmony was believed to be none the less real if those concerned were unconscious of it. The pre-established harmony would operate willy-nilly. According to Adam Smith, the popularizer of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, the individual "neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention."

Out of roots such as these grew the ideas of progress and perfectibility characteristic of the secular as well as of the religious Liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In some quarters these ideas were related to a new faith in man; in other quarters they were related to a thoroughly worked-out philosophy of history; and in still others they were rooted in a belief in "cosmic progress." Within these variations there were still others. Some liberals, for example, emphasized the natural power of Reason, while others, under the influence of Romanticism, emphasized the natural power of Sympathy. In 1885 belief in "the progress of mankind onward and upward forever" became one of the main articles of the Unitarian faith. And, as an eminent Unitarian historian says, Dr. James Freeman Clarke "leaves us in no doubt concerning the importance" he ascribed to the famous Point Five: "He did not intend 'the Progress of Mankind' to be an *omnium gatherum*, or an anti-climax; on the contrary, he regarded the belief in human progress as an essential and a summary of a true Liberal's religion." Dr. Clarke's sermon in which the "Five Points of the New Theology" were first set forth concludes with this affirmation: "The one fact which is written on nature and human life, which accords with all we see and know, is the fact of progress; and this must be accepted as the purpose of the creation." The historian already quoted comments as

W. Montgomery (New York, 1912); Paul Tillich, *Sozialistische Entscheidung* (Potsdam, 1933), pp. 68 ff.

Professor Carr (*op. cit.*) shows the disastrous effect of the theory of "the harmony of interests" on international politics during the past two decades.

follows on Dr. Clarke's general position: "There is ground for believing, indeed, that Dr. Clarke was influenced by the doctrines of Herbert Spencer and August Comte regarding the inevitability of progress—a process and a consummation implicit in the course of evolution and assured by the trend of natural forces."²³

Since the turn of the century some religious liberals have greatly altered their attitude toward the older ideas of progress and perfectibility. Indeed, some of them no longer even mention the ideas, except when singing hymns written a generation or so ago. Moreover, liberalism has taken on new forms as a consequence of the influence of scientific positivism, of ethical relativism, and even of Marxian dialectical materialism,—not to speak of the influence of Marxian Utopianism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suppose that the outlook on the world entertained by the majority of religious liberals has undergone radical modification in respect to belief in the unified structure of the world or in the continuous progress of the race. As operative presupposition if not as explicit doctrine the old beliefs in harmony and perfectibility still serve as a groundwork for "faith." This is especially true among the laity of all the denominations in the left wing of Protestantism, not to mention millions of people outside the churches. In short, the general outlook on life of many people continues to have its roots in the rationalistic "non-tragic" tradition, especially as it took form in the eighteenth century. It is therefore necessary for us to examine critically the basic presuppositions of this tradition in order to understand the present "changing reputation of human nature."

(To be concluded in the next issue.)

²³Charles H. Lyttle, "The Faith of Progress," *The Meadville Theological School Quarterly Bulletin*, XIX (January, 1925), 4. For a recent discussion of the idea of progress as held among religious liberals and Unitarians between 1880 and 1895, see Daniel Day Williams, *The Andover Liberals* (New York, 1941). For a psychoanalytical interpretation of the extreme optimism of nineteenth-century religious Liberalism, see the New Testament scholar Robert P. Casey's article, "Oedipus Motivation in Religious Thought and Fantasy," *Psychiatry*, V (May, 1942), 219-228.

Platonic Influences in the Philosophy of George Santayana

ROGER D. BOSWORTH

I

Santayana has been loosely classed, by those to whom it is more satisfying to classify than to inquire, as a contemporary Platonist. The classification is not without its significance, but it is at best misleading. Even a superficial consideration of the mechanical or structural similarities will reveal slight differences, while a more subtle analysis can lead only to the conclusion that Santayana whole-heartedly denies the metaphysical idealism of Plato.

Early in his philosophical inquiry and religious contemplation, Santayana was attracted by the Platonic type of idealism. He was as the moth that flew around and around the light, irresistably attracted, yet restrained by an intuition that to approach too closely might result in consumption by the flame. Plato's idealism is the light; it is symbolic of the effort toward light which is basic in the human heart. The light, as sought by man and as expressed by Plato, is the attempt to see in a volatile existence that which is unchanging and permanent. It is an aspiration, distinctly human in origin, to meet the unsatisfactory world of present reality by a vision of the ideal world in which all requirements of the human ideal are fulfilled. The philosophy of Plato made this possible.

In the mind of Santayana, every system of religion, every endeavor of art, every idealistic philosophy, may be understood in the light of this formula: man, being dissatisfied with the world that he sees from day to day, constructs, in his moments of insight, a world that is more perfect. He extends his own ideals into the universe.

We dye the world of our own color; by a pathetic fallacy, by a false projection of sentiment, we soak Nature with our own feeling, and then celebrate her tender sympathy with our moral being.¹

This extension of human desire to cosmic fulfillment may be defined as the transformation of the appreciation of beautiful things into

¹Santayana, *Interpretations of Religion and Poetry*.

the worship of an ideal Beauty, and the transformation of the love of particular persons into the love of God.²

The practice may easily be carried on so completely and so devoutly that the individual soon may lose consciousness of just what is taking place until, overcome by his "pathetic fallacy,"

all things become to the worshipper of the ideal so many signs and symbols of what he seeks; like the votary who, kneeling now before one image and then before another, lets his incense float by all with a certain abstracted impartiality, because his aspiration mounts through them equally to the invisible God they alike represent.^{2a}

Santayana himself experienced this conflict between that which is physically real and that which is morally ideal. His Catholic heritage successfully persuaded him of the temporality and even the evil of the world of flux and change; it likewise provided for him an ideal world that was said to be more actual and far more satisfying than the world he saw and experienced. The Catholic Heaven tended to remove one from the present and provide a basis for expected life in the future world. In this future world, the imperfect justice, the incomplete love, and the partial wisdom typical of this world would be replaced by perfect justice, fulfilled love, and complete wisdom. His own experience of conflict is vividly portrayed in all of his earlier works; his sonnets reflect the agony of vacillation; his lectures reveal two desires struggling for supremacy. Even though the mature Santayana discarded the Joseph's coat of Platonism, he never successfully discarded the colors themselves. He denied the sun, but never escaped the reality of the shadow. The spiritual aim of the bulk of his philosophy is to replace in a philosophy of physical realism that which he instinctively knows can never be replaced, the hopefulness found in the Platonic intuition.

Strangely, and in spite of his insistence on realism, he feels the attraction of idealism. He says, in a moment of insight which is characteristic of his general tone,

the beauties that charm our attention and enchain the soul have no real existence; they are momentary visions, irrecoverable moods. And their object is unstable: we never can say what it is, it changes so quickly before our eyes.³

²Santayana, *Platonism in the Italian Poets*.

^{2a}*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

Thus he denies the sun, but almost in the same breath he admits the presence of the shadow, and, though less characteristic in mood, answers himself:

and yet nothing can concern us more, or be more real to us, than this mysterious good, since the pursuit of it gives our lives whatever they have of true earnestness and meaning, and the approach to it whatever they have of joy.⁴

This illustrates the conflict which rumbled in the mind of the young Santayana. But the time of decision was to come to him in the form of a two-sided issue: idealism, religion, and art on the one side, against realism, scepticism, and disillusionment on the other. Being fearless, he chose the latter. The ambitions and desires of his inner passion were made subject to the rational nature of his mind. His sole pledge of allegiance was to seek the Life of Reason. The first problem he must face, and indeed the one he faces constantly in all his works, is this: are these beliefs in perfect goodness and ideal beauty the rational result of knowledge of the world in which we live? Or are they mere projections of the mind without existential verification or objective existence in and of themselves? He answers this question with repeated insistence that perfect goodness and ideal beauty are always projections of the human ideal; yet dogmatism is singularly lacking.

In this fashion the pendulum of his thought swings back and forth between two opposites, each of which has its peculiar attraction. But the tendency is for the weight to linger longer at the side of realism and, even in some moments, to admit only grudgingly the attraction of the other. In this sense the philosophy of Santayana is rooted in a rejection of Platonism, but it is a sad departure in which he feels the necessity of seeking through naturalism the very quality which he rejects because it implies a supernatural. Thus it is evident that whatever philosophy he produces, however realistic in purpose and method, must leave room for some equivalent of Platonic idealism.

*O world, thou choosest not the better part!
It is not wisdom to be only wise,
And on the inward vision close the eyes,
But it is wisdom to believe the heart.*⁵

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Santayana, *Poems*, No. III.

In his first major work, five volumes on *The Life of Reason*, one finds a determined realist seeking without hesitancy that satisfying but rational life. It becomes his only pursuit. There recur frequent utterances, often in the form of a compensatory criticism, of Platonic thoughts. Especially in the two volumes on religion and art does one feel the intense pull of Platonism; but his answer is that in the philosophy of physical realism these undeniable Platonic intuitions must be understood as "only that and nothing more." They are products of the human spirit in its quest of the ideal and perfect. In themselves they are nonexistent. Their presence is entirely within the human mind and their reality is known only to the mind that holds them. They are, in the strictest sense, not credited as having independent existence; their proper locus in the realms of being is in the realm of essence. Here they may subsist eternally regardless of whether chance ever brings any particular essence into physical fulfillment or not.

II

The realm of essence is the most difficult and the most significant aspect of Santayana's metaphysics. It represents, in some aspects, the means which the mature philosopher discovered and employed to preserve the values of Plato's realm of Ideas in a system that in method and content is basically different. In Plato the realm of Ideas was objectified; it was pushed further and further from the world of change until it became the only fundamental reality; Ideas represented Being, and the world of change represented Non-Being. In Santayana the essences are not existents, save as their infinite number and variety is inherently present in all substance. Essence is really the sum total of possible forms, shapes, sizes, colors, smells, tastes, and like qualities potentially present in any given object. A block of wood, for example, may be only a piece of wood cut in a comparatively square fashion. On first seeing it, one may say that it is square—for it suggests the idea of squareness. This is the essence of squareness which may be sensed in looking at a box-like house, a city block, a fireplace tile, or any other of a number of objects which also suggest the same essence. At the same time, none of these objects presents a perfect square, and the essence of squareness may be left in the category of essence without ever coming to its own in the realm

of matter.

In continuing the illustration, the block of wood itself offers an infinite number and endless variety of essences which are there potentially or imaginatively, but not in any necessary sense actually. The block may be cut into any number of shapes and forms. It may be cut in two, or ten, or, imaginatively, a million. The individual pieces may be shaped and changed; the residuum may be ground to powder, and each grain possess its individual essence and other essences which the contemplative person might consider it to have, and so on, *ad infinitum*, until the essences of a single block of wood become more real in the realm of essence than in the wood itself.

The Ideas of Plato are but a fragment of the realm of essence. As one may feel the essence, straightness, yet never find a perfect physical manifestation of the essence and retain the unqualified conviction that straightness could exist, the Platonists have visualized ideal beauty, perfect virtue and justice and ideal form, and insist that they not only could, but actually do have independent existence. Thus, if one were to remove from the Platonic concept of the world of Ideas the proposition of their objectivity, (which is, *pro formâ*, impossible), the remainder would be a segment of the realm of essence described by Santayana. Further, in the realm of essence there is greater freedom and variety. The essence need not be perfect, indeed, it may even be absurd, as, for example, a fire-spewing dragon; it subsists in the realm of essence at the instant someone contemplates the nature of the fiery beast. The dialectician may, if he is over-enthusiastic,

embrace his conclusions not merely as implications of his premises, but as objects of hot animal faith; he may even think he has discovered a metaphysical world, when in truth he has merely elaborated a system of essences, altogether imaginary, and in no way more deeply rooted in reality than any system of essences which a poet or a musician might compose.⁶

Art, poetry, and religion belong alike in the realm of essence. They represent endeavors on the part of man to make real his dreams. They are the projections of his ideal. They consist of the coverings by which he cloaks reality with his own hopes and desires, and the pigments of virtue of which he persuades himself

⁶Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, p. 3.

that the coloring is more real than the actual. The essence *per se*, whether it be of the next shape given a block of wood or of the highest vision of paradise, is pre-existent and immortal; it rests within the realm of being and comes from its natural abode when it becomes the object of attention to any particular individual.

Perhaps the best method of comparing the Ideas of Plato with the Essences of Santayana is to note that there is a difference in the quality of being which they hold. In Plato, Ideas are regarded as the only pure being. They alone are permanent and unchanging; flux and change in the world of non-being stand in some form of imperfect or partial correlation with the pure being of Ideas. The realm of essence, though within the realms of being, is in the strictest sense not existent, but formal. It is not made up of qualities which, under perfect conditions, might be observable, but of the infinite number of potential qualities within substance, the nature of which a contemplative person can imagine to exist. Thus there is a distinct difference between the two categories, and yet with a subtlety that beggars any so brief analysis one must acknowledge the presence of such Timæus-like sayings as this:

The realm of essence is comparable to an infinite Koran—or the Logos that was in the beginning—written in invisible but indelible ink, prophesying all that Being could ever be or contain: and the flux of existence is the magical re-agent, traveling over it in a thin stream, like a reader's eye, and bringing here one snatch of it and there another to the light for a passing moment.⁷

Or still more beguiling in its implications,

Essences are immediately given, but they show only the general nature of the object perceived. Over (transcendent) the object is its 'existence' or its perfect form.⁸

But the apparent paradox is resolved in recognizing that though immutable and intrinsic, essences are non-existent, subsisting in the universe and awaiting discovery by sentient beings. In the strictest sense, the contemplation of an essence is a response to nature, and the probability is that the essence is intuitive rather than actual in nature.

The 'sane' response to nature is by action only and by an economy which nature can accept and weave into her own material economy; but

⁷Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, p. 22.

⁸Santayana, *Poetry in Religion*, p. 216.

as to the terms of sense and discourse, they are all from the very beginning equally arbitrary, poetical, and (if you choose) mad, yet equally symptomatic. They vary initially and intangibly from mind to mind, even in expressing the same routine of nature.⁹

Santayana admits that there is a tendency toward Platonism in his realm of essence.

I might almost say that my theory is a variant of Platonism, designed to render Platonic logic and morals consistent with the facts of nature.¹⁰

But he hastens to add that his departure is so great that it constitutes a complete readjustment removing much that is Platonic. He simply extends the realm of Ideas until it is freed from any connection with natural forces. The Philosophy of Plato, he objects, was founded on essences and their intuition, but

soon materialized them into existences, spirits, and powers (objects of belief not amenable to intuition),¹¹

which tended to make power of mere essence. It became an extension of the natural into the supernatural followed by an absolutizing of the supernatural. This is not valid in the light of logic because that which is absolutized is not subject to any test or even to intuition.

When it calls these existences sensations, atoms, space, time, or persons, and wonders which of these names describes them best, the test does not lie in any comparison of the essences evoked by those names and the essences of the existing objects, for since these objects are removed facts their essences cannot be present to intuition.¹²

The contemplation of an essence is thus visualized as a normal human procedure, and may be indulged willy nilly except for the fact that this projection of the human mind must not be regarded as proof of the existent reality of the essence contemplated. This is the crux of the difference between the Ideas of Plato and the essences of Santayana, for in the thought of the former the realm of Ideas is objective, actual, the only permanent reality. Ideas are the center of the realms of Being in Plato, and are understood as our imperfect senses recall our attention to them. In the thought of Santayana, the material world is the center and the essences are present because contemplated and not as objects of sensual per-

⁹Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, Preface, p. ix.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 158.

ception. From this point of view, one who contemplates an essence is in no wise deceived by the impulse to make a doctrine of it; he cannot be seduced, by either the beauty of the concept or the promptings of his spirit, to say that his vision is more real than the matter from which it embarked.

There is, therefore, more than a dialectical difference between these two philosophers, for their rudimentary concepts spring from opposite assumptions. The similarity of the moral ideal in Santayana to the metaphysical realm of Ideas in Plato is so misleading as to lead many to the conclusion that they are speaking of the same quality of Being. We have observed that this is not accurate.

III

The Realm of Matter is in many portions the most consistently realistic of all Santayana's works. At the same time, from the first page of the Preface, there is an expression of the longing to escape the influence of Plato without losing the joys that accompany it. He begins with a denial of the negative quality of matter, mostly because he believes what he says, but partly because he feels that the negative is half implied in his own belief.

Matter seems an evil to the sour moralist because it is often untoward, and an occasion of imperfection in things. But if he took a wider view matter would seem good to him, because it is the principle of existence: it is all things in their potentiality, and therefore the condition of all their excellence or possible perfection.¹³

His first postulate is that matter has objective existence. There is a reality which is independent of human discovery of it. The critical study of the perceptive faculties of man may alter or even overthrow the concepts relative to that existence, but the things and events and substances in themselves are separate from and independent of the knowledge or lack of knowledge held by man concerning them. He even goes so far as to admit the impossibility of ultimate knowledge about the nature of matter, but this is no foundation for the assertion that matter does not exist.

Human ideas of matter are initially as various as human contacts with it, and as human sensations in its presence. These ideas are sensuous and pictorial from the beginning. . . . But of course all human notions of matter, even if not positively fabulous, must be wholly inadequate;

¹³Santayana, *The Realm of Matter*, Preface, p. v.

otherwise the natural philosopher would be claiming a plenitude of miraculous illumination such as no prophet even thought to possess.¹⁴

Matter is essentially the source of all that is. It is the raw material from which totality and all its parts are made. Even the conception of the evility of matter and the mental projection of an "other" realm is an essence, an intuition, grounded in the realm of matter. The denial of the material world is a blasphemy against one's own nature and origin.

*Who is that goddess to whom men should pray,
But her from whom their hearts turned away,
Out of whose virgin being they were born,
Whose mother-nature they have named with scorn,
Calling her holy substance common clay. . . .*

*Ah, when I think this earth on which I tread
Hath borne these blossoms of the lovely dead,
And makes the living heart I love to beat,
I look with sudden awe beneath my feet—
As you with erring reverence overhead.¹⁵*

Matter is best understood as the basic reality; the field of activity; the realm in which creation and change is taking place. One must of necessity begin here if he is to honestly interpret the world and himself. It is in this realm that one finds the stuff from which the infinite variety of essences may be formed. The exact nature of matter is, as in the metaphysics of Spencer, unknowable, but there are certain properties which are indispensable to it, and others which may be presumed. There are five properties of matter which Santayana considers indispensable:

1. The first has already been suggested in the affirmation that substance is "external to the thought which posits it."¹⁶

2. Substance has parts; it constitutes a physical space, and of logical necessity, these parts are external to one another. For example: matter is posited in thought as a field of action and there must be something external to the positing thought; and further, if action takes place, it must be by virtue of an agent external to the organ of the action itself.

3. Substance is in a constant state of change and flux, and therefore constitutes a physical time. Time is the relation of

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. viii.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 10.

changes perpetually occurring in the parts which make up substance.

4. There are distinctions in positions and characters of the agents in action, and they make changes in one another, therefore substance is unequally distributed in time and space.

5. The only basis for positing substance is as an agent in the field of action. Therefore all substance recognized as such must be in the region of the observer. It must be in the scope of observation in which he is relatively central. This brings the recognition that it is a relative cosmos with parts variously related to one another and to the observer.

In addition to these qualities which are essential, there are certain properties of matter which may be presumed, for they are discoverable through observation and experience. These additional properties further illustrate the idea that everything has its roots in matter; it is the true mother, the basic source.

1. Substance is diversified in the field of nature; it takes different forms. Even the forms of living animals with "feelings, images and thoughts." Mental facts are not material and "offer no butt for action and exercise no physical control on one another."¹⁷ But:

2. They, the mental facts, are there because they have occurrence as parts of a total natural event. They are expressions or manifestations of matter. They are controlled and governed as well as created by the flux of the substance which underlies them.

3. The behaviors, phases and actions through which substance passes are continuous. There is flux in action, but in method there is continuity.

4. It is possible on the basis of study and observation of phenomena to calculate and extend action, for the basic quality of substance remains the same at all times.

5. The occurrence of any phenomena is a direct outgrowth of the phases or modes of action which went before it. The phenomena is not contained in that which went before, but its nature is predetermined by what took place as antecedent. "Predetermined by them in its place and quality, and proportionate to them in

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 41.

extent and intensity."¹⁸

Matter, then, is the substance which is posited as external to thought and implied whenever perception, action, memory, or hope enter into the realm of experience. Its parts are external to one another, each being a point of existence. This is a relative cosmos, in a state of flux and change taking place in orderly sequence, and with parts unequally distributed in nature. It is the source of all phenomena, even of those which are not substantial in nature and quality; these unsubstantial phenomena are significant as manifestations of the substance basic to them. There is a continuity in the behavior of the flux so that, given a certain set of circumstances, the same thing will always take place. Matter is admittedly posited by animal faith, and the impressions and considerations evoked by observation of material forms are the sources of insight into potential and realized essences.

IV

These observations of the tone of *The Life of Reason* and the tendencies illustrated in *The Realm of Essence* and *The Realm of Matter* indicate rather clearly that in spite of similarity in motive and impulse, there is a decided difference between the philosophy of Plato and that of Santayana. Though motivated by a common need, that of discovering in a world of flux and change that which is permanent and unchanging, Plato meets the need by positing a separate realm of perfection and Santayana seeks the same result in nature. In Platonic thought the realm of Ideas is the only reality of which this world is an imperfect reflection; in Santayana, the realm of matter is the source of all that is, and the realm of essences is the imperfect reflection. It may be truly said that Santayana longs for the happiness and ease which might be his if he could follow Plato, but, being unable to travel that noble road, seeks the same benefits through materialistic interpretation of the world and man. Thus the identity of Santayana as a contemporary Platonist is inaccurate because it is based on similarity of aspiration rather than on identity of conclusions. That this was a sad departure does not alter the fact that it was a willful and deliberate departure. Likewise, that it is willful and deliberate does not alter the fact that it was sad.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 42.

Knowledge and Religion¹

JULIUS KRAFT

About twenty years ago I had a short but unforgettable conversation with a Chinese student. He and I enjoyed the privilege of studying at the old German university of Göttingen, which like Princeton, was founded in the first half of the eighteenth century. The young Chinese and I once took a walk through the lovely environs of Göttingen. But the impressions of the landscape did not wholly occupy my mind, and I asked my Chinese friend this question: "What were you taught as a child regarding the creation of the world?" It did not take even a moment before I got the clear quiet answer: "Confucius said, 'I do not say anything about things which I do not know.'"

The admiration which this answer and the character of its articulation immediately evoked in me has only increased with growing personal experience. Indeed, nothing seems to be more difficult for human minds to reach than a receptivity for knowledge in the wide sense that they are not closed to the hidden truths of religion. Only in the possession of this truth will men show that incomparable peace of the soul which is one of the greatest achievements of a harmonious human being.

How bewildered were most of the people I met as a student and as a teacher! In fact, their minds represented in an accentuated manner the extraordinary bewilderment of the contemporary world, a world which in new and most radical form now reaps the consequence of the age-old dogma that knowledge excludes religion and that religion excludes knowledge. This dogma is the very source of religious unbelief as well as of religious superstition.² Both of these extremes, unbelief and superstition, have dominated and still dominate the position of religion in human life. If there is no religious knowledge, then people who are serious minded enough to reject a truth which they can not understand will find themselves compelled to abandon religion altogether. And people who feel that there must be religious truth will then have to sacri-

¹An address delivered in the Unitarian Church in Rochester, N. Y., on Laymen's Sunday, June 8, 1941.

²A systematic treatment of this assertion will be found in my *Erkenntnis und Glaube* (Leiden, 1937).

fice their intellect in order to have a religion. Thus humanity becomes divided into two groups: those who wish to make consistent use of the human prerogative of reason and who finally become de-humanized by denying the existence of the religious world, and those to whom such realities appear through the medium of superstitious imagination. Fortunately among both groups common sense plays a role, too, and counteracts their narrow views. But as a result there remains a tottering religious life tending sometimes to the most exaggerated forms of fanaticism.

Nobody who adheres without fanaticism to a religious conviction may live without misgiving in a fanatic world. He has to understand this world in order to deepen and to maintain his own views, which are endangered every day not only by his open enemies but also by his friends.

Certainly every free mind considers science, in the general sense of exact knowledge, to be his friend, since one cannot love truth without loving the truth of science. Such a person may or may not be a scientist himself; yet he will always greet the progress of science and defend its liberty. But he should be duly warned not to identify science itself and the philosophy of many scientists about science. This philosophy may say that science is more than merely one of the ways to truth; it may proclaim that it is the only way to truth. Such philosophy expresses not the view of science but the view of "scientism." Now the eternal things are of no use in the laboratory or in historical research; they are not the object of mathematical considerations. Therefore a type of scientism which only admits these kinds of knowledge leads to religious unbelief. But one should keep in mind the fact that this unbelief is no more a result of science than scientism itself. They are both dilettante views taken by those who do not really know the borders of certain special fields of knowledge. If already produced and accepted by specialists themselves, how easily will such views be repeated by the mere friend of science, who finds, of course, his friendship very ungratefully rewarded by the robbery of his religion.

Scientism exercises in essence the same robber-function when it is not frank enough to confess religious unbelief but pretends instead that there are so-called *religious experiences*. But if this strange term, religious experience, does not already frighten a

sound mind away, a little bit of thinking will make it clear that there cannot be such a kind of experience. Indeed, how should experience, which always refers to spatial and temporal things, tell us anything about eternal things? It would have to be a rather mysterious experience to be capable of such results, and therefore the standpoint of religious experience leads in fact to mysticism—the death of science and of knowledge.

However, there is a more sophisticated substitute which scientism offers for religion. This substitute is neither psychology, nor history, nor sociology. It is not factual knowledge at all; it is the knowledge of the genuine purposes of our life: *ethics*. In spite of the fact that the identification of ethics and religion is defended by two of the greatest living scientists, Russell and Einstein, it cannot satisfy the need of the unprejudiced mind. Certainly ethics teaches us values and religion conveys values too. Yet it is up to us to realize ethical values, and in this task we may fail, while in the religious order of things there cannot be any imperfection: its holy order is the object of our devotion and not the goal of our action. There should be no doubt about this: it is a great step forward from purely religious unbelief and from the illusion of religious experience to the religion of ethics. But the lack of distinction between the humanly good and the holy—modifying a mystical idea of Plato—establishes confusion in the field of religious feeling as well as of moral action. It replaces the peace of the religious mind by a restlessness of action, and it endangers realistic action by a retirement to an attitude of devotion to the ethical order of things.

Strangely enough to the progressive adherent of the religion of ethics, precisely these two attitudes, restlessness of action and devotion to an inadequate object, are to be found also in one of the most powerful and destructive religious forces of our time: the new political religions. Everybody is familiar with the names of their idols, The Class and The Race, and everybody knows that the executive organs of these new gods, the modern dictators, ask for themselves god-like honors much more consistently than Roman emperors did. They indeed demand the whole life of their subjects, keeping them continuously busy and pretending that they are serving as the true trustees of the people's salvation. It is the practice of this salvation first of all to compel blind belief in

the new political religions, and finally to sacrifice generations for the power-lust of so-called supermen. We do not need to read about the cruelties of religious persecutions and religious wars; we are their witnesses in the twentieth century! Let us not be complacent spectators of this horrible spectacle! Let us remember that it would not have happened if we had lived up to our responsibilities, among these our intellectual responsibilities, since nobody may overlook the fact that present-day political religions with their sociological and biological formulas are in fact popularized products of a religious development which was engendered by a superstitious faith in science.

The acceptance of this "exact" superstition was of course no accident. It was a reaction against traditions in all spheres of life including the religious one, a sphere already long felt to be unsatisfactory. It was in particular an expression of the hope that a new religion would bring a better life, too. But in fact the whole process is only a radical cultural relapse. In that respect it is very significant that we experience at the same time the orthodoxy of the new political religions and a new orthodoxy of religious tradition. When I attended some years ago a series of lectures delivered by an internationally known orthodox Protestant theologian, I felt that his lectures should have been accompanied by a pyre behind him for the heretics. And I did not exactly know what to abhor more, his zealotry or the new heathenish revelations. But this I do know, that Kant, the greatest philosopher of modern times, was profoundly right when he stated in his *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*: "All things, even the most sublime ones may become derogated at the hands of human beings."

This derogation is by no means an unavoidable one. On the contrary it has always been avoided and it will be avoided according to the degree to which we acknowledge the power as well as the boundaries of our knowledge. "No human being is able to see God"—this old phrase expresses a fundamental limitation of our knowledge. But to conclude "since God is not visible, he does not exist," is to apply an arrogant and a short-sighted scientism. The unprejudiced mind, being free from the fantastic wish to see the invisible, feels it appropriate to the human mind to remain at a great distance from the eternal. This attitude of distance toward an order of things in which we are to be endowed with eternal

existence under the holy rule of the Creator is taken in a genuine manner of "faith." Faith in this sense is a particularly profound, true conviction; it is knowledge in the general sense of the word; and it remains knowledge whether or not one is able to formulate and justify it adequately. They are really "doubting Thomases" who are not satisfied with this modest kind of religious conviction (which is in fact not opposed to knowledge) but who are waiting for signs and miracles. As they are in fact unbelieving, they are also not capable of understanding the richness of indirect approaches to the eternal, which the world of experience offers us. Therefore they have only a superficial relation to positive religion. They are not able to appreciate it in its mighty power of pictorial religious expression. Approaching positive religion, they are somewhat like children on the search for a magical country. But besides this they have no understanding of the tender but revealing symbolic language spoken by the sea and by the mountains, by the appearance of human beings who are worthy of our love, and by the greatness of art. They are living in a silent world. But the world is not guilty of that silence. He whose ears are closed certainly cannot hear.

Religion and knowledge are not enemies. They are united through the common idea of truth, and they are furthermore united by the fact that there is no truth, either in science or in religion, without reasons. The more hidden those reasons are, the more effort will be needed to acquire them. Religion, still more than science, is not a gift; it is the fruit of the hard toil of keeping our minds open to the fullest extent. It is therefore brute primitivism in religious education to indoctrinate youth, for that means in fact to close their souls. Such indoctrinated souls will always tend to religious indifference or even to enmity toward religion. Only a religious education guided by the idea of religious knowledge can some day—not today and not tomorrow—bring to mankind that peace of the soul which spoke to me through the quiet answer of my Chinese friend.

Hymns, the Universal Language of Worship*

MARION FRANKLIN HAM

According to the best authorities, a hymn is "a religious ode or poem"; more specifically, "any metrical composition divided into stanzas or verses, intended to be used in worship."

A glance at the historical background of the hymn will reveal its antiquity. The use of the hymn in worship extends so far back into the past that it is difficult to trace its beginning. In some form it has been used to express religious feeling ever since man began to worship.

Probably the oldest hymn of which we have any knowledge is the Accadian hymn which was sung to the Moon god, Hurkis, in Babylonia. Archaeologists agree that it was used at Ur at least five thousand years ago. Penitential hymns of very ancient date have been found engraved on Assyrian tablets. Renouf, in his *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, says that hymns of much power and beauty were produced by that primitive faith. The Vedic hymns of India were of no great value, but were certainly of great antiquity. In China, Confucius made a collection of forty poems, which he called "*Songs of the Temple*"; these hymns were used in worship. The Homeric hymns of Greece were really brief addresses to the gods, but were sometimes sung by worshipers. Roman worship was silent and reverential, but the attendants in the Roman temples occasionally chanted songs.

Reville, in his accounts of the civilizations of the New World, calls attention to the hymns used by the Incas in South America. They were neither beautiful nor inspiring, but evidently served to voice the aspirations of the worshipers in song. The North American Indians used certain incantations which might be classed as hymns of inferior quality; songs of primitive weirdness which were sung in the savage dances.

Up to the advent of the Christian era the Hebrew race had developed the highest expression of worship poetry. "It is generally conceded," says a writer on this subject, "that the Hebrew Psalter,

*An address delivered at the Commencement Day exercises of The Meadville Theological School, held in The First Unitarian Church of Chicago, June 16, 1942.

as a whole, has never been equalled"; and this production of hymns began very early in Jewish history. The book of Genesis (4:21) refers to Jubal as "the father of all such as handle the harp and organ." One of the earliest attempts at hymn writing in the Scriptures is the Song of Lamech (Gen. 4:23, 24):

Hear my voice, ye wives of Lamech!

It serves as an example of the primitive penitential hymn.

In the book of Exodus (15:21) we find the song of Miriam, the sister of Moses; a hymn of praise and rejoicing, called forth by the delivery of the Israelites from the Egyptian army at the Red Sea:

Sing ye to the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously!

The Ninetieth Psalm, sometimes called the "Swan Song of Moses," is a very stately and beautiful hymn, beginning:

*Lord, thou hast been our
dwelling place in all generations,*

and ending,

*Let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us,
and establish thou the work of our hands upon us.*

The song of Deborah and Barak in the book of Judges (Chap. V), is cast in the metrical form of a hymn of praise. In the book of First Samuel (2:1-10) we find another hymn of praise, beginning:

My heart rejoiceth in the Lord!

Solomon is credited with the authorship of many psalms, but his name is signed to only two in the collection. His father, David, is also the reputed author of many psalms; but probably most of the so-called "psalms of David" were the work of unknown authors.

At the beginning of the Christian era the hymn was in general use among the Hebrews. The first chapter of the Gospel of Luke contains a hymn which is now known as the *Magnificat of Mary* (1:46-55):

*And Mary said,
My soul doth magnify the Lord!*

This chapter of Luke also contains the Song of Zacharias, called *The Benedictus*, and the Song of Elizabeth, sometimes called *The Lesser Benedictus*.

These hymns were all sung in the Christian churches at an early date. The Gospels tell us that Jesus and his disciples sang a hymn at the close of the Last Supper, and went out into the Mount of

Olives. We have no means of knowing what the hymn was, but we may assume that it was one of the psalms in general use at the time.

The hymn has always been a vital part of Christian worship. Paul recommended the singing of hymns, in his letters to the churches. In his letter to the Colossians (3:16) he writes: "Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly, in all wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another, in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the Lord." In Pliny's letter to the Emperor Trajan, written in the year 103 A.D., he says: "They (the Christians) had been accustomed to come together on a fixed day, before daylight, to sing responsively a song to Christ as a god." There is no record of this hymn. Probably it was a hymn of adoration and praise which was sung in the churches of the first and second centuries, and was then displaced by hymns better suited to the changing thought of the Christian movement. We need not attempt to trace in detail the development of the hymn through the centuries. We can get the general view of the subject by touching briefly upon some phases of it and mentioning the names of some of the prominent writers.

Justin Martyr compiled a book of hymns that were in use in the churches of his time. He entitled it *Psalter*. This book is mentioned by Eusebius, Jerome, and Genadius, but the book itself has been completely lost. Only one hymn of that collection has been preserved, a hymn addressed to *Christ, the Savior*. It was probably written by Clement of Alexandria. This hymn has been beautifully translated by Henry M. Dexter, beginning:

Shepherd of tender youth.

The next Christian hymn of which we have any record is mentioned by Saint Basil:

Joyful light of the holy glory.

It is sometimes called the *Candle-light hymn*. John Keble and Henry W. Longfellow have given us the best translations of it. The best hymn writers of the Eastern Church were Valentinus, Bardesanes, and Ephraem Syrus, who is called the father of Syrian hymnody; but Ambrose, who lived in the fourth century, was the really great hymn writer of the early church. There are ninety-two hymns of the Ambrosian school in existence, and the Ambrosian form of chant was used in all the churches until Pope Gregory

the Great introduced the Gregorian Chant, which displaced the Ambrosian and is still in use today.

During the Middle Ages the great hymn writers of the Greek Church were Saint Andrews of Crete, and John of Damascus. John Mason Neele has given us some excellent translations of these Greek hymns.

In the Roman Church, Prudentius, Sedulius, and Fortunatus carried on the great tradition. Fortunatus was a writer of great insight and power. One of his best hymns has been translated by John Chandler:

The royal banner is unfurled.

This hymn is still in use.

Robert II, King of France, Saint Bernard of Cluny, and Thomas Aquinas wrote some good hymns in a later period.

Since the Reformation we have had such great hymn writers as Martin Luther, whose majestic hymn, written in the vernacular, is a classic:

Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott.

Luther wrote thirty-seven hymns in all. Other noted German hymn writers were Martin Rinkart, Paul Gerhardt, Christian Richter and Gerhardt Terstegen. Terstegen, a German ribbon weaver, wrote one hundred and eleven hymns, some of which take first rank.

The leading English hymn writers of the Elizabethan period were Robert Herrick, John Milton, Henry Vaughan, and Jeremy Taylor. The hymns of Bishop Ken stand high in the worship poetry of the English language. Isaac Watts, who is called the father of English hymnody, wrote hymns that have been more widely sung than those of any other hymn writer. John and Charles Wesley were prolific hymn writers. Charles Wesley wrote over six thousand hymns, and perhaps three or four hundred of them are still in use. Other prominent English hymn writers were William Cowper, Augustus Toplady, James Montgomery, Reginald Heber, John Keble, Frederick Faber and John Henry Newman.

"The Unitarians," says one treatise on hymnology, "have produced some remarkable hymn writers. In England, Sarah Flower Adams, Sir John Bowring, Anna Barbauld, James Martineau and George Tarrant; and in America, William Cullen Bryant, Samuel

Longfellow, Edmund Hamilton Sears, Samuel Johnson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Julia Ward Howe, William C. Gannett, Theodore Williams, Frederick L. Hosmer, and many more whose work is distinguished by great power and beauty. The world is just beginning to recognize the invaluable contribution which Unitarians have made to English hymnody."

Dr. Henry Wilder Foote, in one of his Harvard Summer School addresses, called attention to this phase of the development of English hymnody. "Unitarians themselves," he said, "have hardly realized the significance of their contribution to the devotional life of their country through their hymnology. It is a fact that at least half the hymns of high quality and permanent value written in this country since the beginning of American hymnody, about the year 1800, have come from Unitarian sources. For the past century and a quarter, down to our day, these writers have produced an unfailling stream of religious lyrics of fine literary quality and deep religious feeling. The greater part of this verse has been of the contemplative type; hymns of the inner life, tinged with mysticism. A smaller number, though a very important group, have been hymns of social righteousness. No other religious body in America has produced anything like so large, so varied or so noble a volume of religious song."

The Episcopal Communion has given us such great hymn writers as Robert Grant, Henry Lyte, Eliza Scudder and Phillips Brooks; the Presbyterians, Horatius Bonar and George Matheson; the Congregationalists, William De Witt Hyde and Washington Gladden; the Universalists, Edwin Chapin and John Coleman Adams; the Methodists, the two Wesleys; the Baptists, Mrs. Sigourney and Samuel Smith, the author of "*My Country, 'Tis of Thee.*"

Unfortunately, there is another side to the picture. There have been hymn writers of the so-called "Gospel Hymn" variety, whose productions have added nothing to the dignity, beauty or power of the hymn as a medium of worship, but have really cheapened and degraded worship poetry to the level of mere doggerel.

The hymn in its highest form is the medium or instrument of worship that is universal in its scope and appeal. It perfectly expresses the devotional aspirations of people of all races and forms of belief. People who differ radically in their doctrinal opinions, and could find no common ground of worship in a statement of

belief, join readily and whole-heartedly in the singing of hymns that voice the common search for the Infinite and express the common hopes and desires of humanity. It is interesting to observe people of different and even antagonistic forms of faith unconsciously unite their minds and hearts in the singing of a great hymn.

So we may call the hymn in its highest form, which is its proper form, the universal language of worship. The language which the heart of man speaks everywhere, whatever tongue his head may use to express his religious opinions. This, then, is the test of a good hymn: Does it perfectly express the worship emotions of the people of all forms of faith? If it meets these requirements, it is a good hymn, provided, of course, it passes the other tests of literary excellence. If it does not, it cannot be classed as a good hymn, however excellent it may be as a metrical composition.

To illustrate: many of the Hebrew psalms as they appear in their original form are addressed to Jehovah, or Yahweh, the tribal god of the Jews. The seventh psalm in the collection begins:

*O Jehovah, my God, how excellent is thy
name in all the earth.*

In that form the psalms fell just short of fulfilling the purpose of the true hymn, because they appealed only to the Jew and expressed only his reverence for his tribal god.

Some of the hymn writers of the Christian Church limited the usefulness of their hymns in the same way, by addressing them to the tribal god of the Jews. Isaac Watts begins one of his hymns with the words:

*Jehovah is the Sovereign Lord
And universal king.*

Many hymn writers, with equal lack of discernment, have limited the usefulness of their hymns by trying to make them metrical expressions of doctrine. This was a common failing of hymn writers in the past; fortunately, we are not so much plagued with it today. It began with Ephraem Syrus, who tried to counteract the teachings of the Gnostics by inserting doctrinal statements in his hymns. Later, Chrysostom did the same thing to combat the teachings of Arius.

But we do not have to go back to the fourth century for examples. Take, for instance, the hymn which is included, in some form, in every hymn book in use today:

Come, thou Almighty King.

It is commonly called The Italian Hymn. The author is unknown, but the hymn has been in use since 1757. It appears in its original form in the hymnals of all our evangelical churches. It was written, apparently, to reassert the doctrine of The Trinity. The first stanza is addressed to the Father :

Come, thou Almighty King!

Help us thy name to sing,

Help us to praise;

Father all-glorious,

O'er all victorious,

Come and reign over us,

Ancient of days!

The second stanza is addressed to the Son :

Come, thou incarnate Word,

Gird on thy mighty sword!

The third stanza is addressed to the Holy Ghost :

Come, Holy Comforter,

Thy sacred witness bear.

The fourth stanza includes all three persons of the Trinity :

To the great One in Three,

Eternal praises be.

Of course, no monotheist, Jew or gentile, anywhere could conscientiously sing such a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. This being the case, the hymn had to be either rejected or revised by the hymnal committees of liberal churches. So the compilers of our Unitarian hymnals revised the hymn and made a real hymn of it. The inspirational quality of the revised stanzas more than justifies the revision. The first stanza was left unchanged. The second stanza was changed from

Come, thou incarnate Word,

Gird on thy mighty sword!

to

Come, thou all gracious Lord,

By heaven and earth adored.

The third stanza was omitted altogether ; and the fourth stanza was changed from

To the great One in Three,

Eternal praises be,

To

*Never from us depart,
Rule thou in every heart.*

With these changes the hymn becomes a universal medium of worship that can be sung by people of all forms of faith.

Another example of the doctrinal hymn is Reginald Heber's

*Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty,
God in three persons, blessed Trinity.*

The editors of our Unitarian hymnals stripped this hymn of its doctrinal verbiage also. This does not mean that they made a Unitarian hymn of it, by inserting statements of Unitarian belief. That would have been as bad as leaving it untouched. The hymn as it appears in our Unitarian hymnals expresses neither Unitarian nor Trinitarian doctrine, and thus becomes a true hymn.

Perhaps the best example of the doctrinal hymn is William Cowper's *Cleansing Fountain*:

*There is a fountain filled with blood
Drawn from Immanuel's veins;
And sinners plunged beneath its flood
Lose all their guilty stains.*

This hymn, which at one time was included in all evangelical hymnals but is now omitted from many of them, sets forth, in rather gruesome fashion, and in the form of worship poetry, the ancient dogma of salvation by blood sacrifice. The author's attempt to incorporate the doctrine of the blood atonement in a hymn fails to state the doctrine convincingly, and destroys the power and beauty of his hymn as a medium of worship.

One of the encouraging things about modern hymnody is the growing evidence that the doctrinal hymn is slowly giving place to a more wholesome and inspiring type of worship poetry.

Then there are certain infelicities of expression which tend to mar the beauty of hymns and prevent them from achieving distinction as really great worship poetry. The use of one wrong word in a hymn will sometimes destroy the effectiveness of the entire hymn, by creating an unpleasant mental picture. So the hymn writer must be exceedingly careful in his choice of words and phrases. In his selection of words he must consider the association of ideas and try to see just what mental picture a word may conjure up in the mind of the person who may read or sing the hymn. A hymn writ-

ten by Henry Ware, Jr., in 1819, will serve as an illustration :

*Great God, the followers of thy Son,
We bow before thy mercy-seat,
To worship thee, the Holy One,
And pour our wishes at thy feet.*

That word "pour" in the last line creates a bad mental picture. The word is usually associated with water or other liquids, and we get the suggestion here of pouring wishes at the feet of God as one pours water out of a pitcher onto the ground. This one word mars the beauty of the entire hymn. The line could have been greatly strengthened by a better choice of words.

Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes uses a line in one of his hymns which could have been greatly strengthened by the change of one word in the line :

On thee we fling our burdening woe.

The word "fling" fails by just a little of being the right one. It does not quite describe the act of placing our woes upon the sustaining providence of God. To fling is to "cast from the hand, to hurl, to throw off with a sudden forceful motion." Certainly we do not fling our woes upon God with that kind of movement, as one would throw a stone or a ball or a missile. The word creates the wrong mental picture; and we are surprised to find it in this hymn because Dr. Holmes was a stickler for just the right word to express his thought. That one must have slipped into the line when he was not looking. Aside from this one weakness, the hymn is superb, one of the finest productions of a great hymn writer.

In one of Thomas Gill's hymns he uses a line which could have been amended to advantage by the change of a word :

Thou shalt not find us dumb.

The word "dumb" has two meanings. It means "incapable of speech," and also it means "stupidity." The use of the word in a hymn is risky, and in this case disastrous, because it is used in a line near the end of the hymn, which leaves the singer in a questioning frame of mind, when he ought to be at the climax of his devotional sentiment. A glance at the ordinary hymnal will disclose many such words and lines.

My soul pants to view his glorious face.

"Pants" is a good word in its proper place, but a hymn is not that place. It means "to breathe rapidly," or "to desire ardently"; but

it gives us the mental picture of a dog, panting, and spoils it as a description of the soul's longing for God.

Unspotted are the ways of God,

says another line; but we do not like that description of the infinite perfection.

Another line in a well-known hymn asks God to

Chase the shades of night away.

The word "chase" presents the picture of the clamor and tumult of a vehement pursuit of something which one wishes to possess or drive away. We can hardly imagine God dispelling the shades of night by chasing them.

Thomas Aquinas creates an unpleasant mental picture in one of his hymns by using a symbol of self-sacrifice:

Deign, O Jesus, pelican of heaven,

Me a sinner in thy blood to lave.

He was referring to the ancient fable which said that the pelican feeds its young with the blood from its own breast; an interesting picture of self-sacrifice, but not helpful or inspiring when used as a description of the self-sacrificing nature of Jesus.

These examples of infelicities of expression in hymn writing show how easily a good hymn can be marred and weakened by the use of one inappropriate or inadequate word.

Having pointed out certain hymns in which these infelicities of expression occur, it seems only fair to mention a few of the hymns in common use that meet all the requirements of good hymn production. A hymn written by Ambrose, Bishop of Milan in the fourth century, takes first rank:

O Strength and Stay upholding all creation,

Who ever dost thyself unmoved abide,

Yet day by day, the light in due gradation

From hour to hour through all its changes guide.

The language in the translation is beautiful; and the hymn, unmarred by doctrinal references or verbal inadequacies, is universal in its appeal.

Aurelius Prudentius, a Spaniard, wrote a hymn in the fifth century which still holds its own in our modern hymnals as a perfect example of the true hymn:

Now with creation's morning song

Let us, as children of the day,

*With wakened heart and purpose strong,
The works of darkness cast away.*

In the sixth century two fine hymns were written, one by Anicius Boethius, and the other by Pope Gregory the Great. The hymn by Boethius begins:

*O thou whose power o'er moving worlds presides,
Whose voice created, and whose wisdom guides.*

The hymn by Pope Gregory is even more stately and beautiful:

*Now, when the dusky shades of night retreating
Before the sun's red banner swiftly flee.*

In the ninth century Rabanas Maurus wrote a good hymn, translated by John Dryden in 1693, beginning:

*Creator Spirit, by whose aid
The world's foundations first were laid.*

In the seventeenth century Johann Franke, a German writer, produced a hymn of great power and beauty, commonly called the Russian Hymn, because it was set to music by the Russian composer, Alexis Lwoff:

*We praise thee, Lord, with earliest morning ray;
We praise thee with the growing light of day;*

Among the productions of more modern hymn writers the hymn by George Croly, written in 1854, is an excellent illustration of the true hymn:

*Spirit of God, descend upon my heart,
Wean it from earth, through all its pulses move.*

Another hymn of rare literary excellence and beauty is the hymn written by Harriet Beecher Stowe, in 1855; a classic in the field of worship poetry:

*Still, still with thee, when purple morning breaketh,
And the bird waketh and the shadows flee;
Fairer than morning, lovelier than the daylight,
Dawns the sweet consciousness, I am with thee.*

John Ellerton's hymn as it appears in the hymnals of the liberal churches meets all the requirements of the true hymn:

*Father, again to thy dear name we raise,
With one accord, our parting hymn of praise.*

The well-known hymn by Henry Francis Lyte, written in 1847, takes first rank as an excellent piece of worship poetry if the last stanza is omitted. The doctrinal tinge in the closing stanza limits

the usefulness of the hymn. This stanza is not included in some of our American hymn-books. The opening lines of the hymn express the soul's deepest yearning:

*Abide with me! fast falls the eventide;
The darkness deepens; Lord, with me abide!*

Cardinal Newman's hymn, written in 1833, is a fine example of worship poetry, entirely free from the flaws which mar so many of the hymns written in that period:

*Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom,
Lead thou me on.*

The stirring hymn written by Felix Adler, in 1878, is one of the notable contributions to American Hymnody of the nineteenth century:

*Hail the glorious golden city,
Pictured by the seers of old.*

The hymn by William Pierson Merrill, written in the same meter, is equally effective as a hymn of thanksgiving:

*Not alone for mighty empire,
Stretching far o'er land and sea.*

The fine hymn by Katherine Lee Bates should be mentioned as one of the outstanding productions of recent years in the field of hymn writing:

*O beautiful for spacious skies,
For amber waves of grain,
For purple mountain majesties
Above the fruited plain!
America! America!
God shed his grace on thee,
And crown thy good with brotherhood
From sea to shining sea!*

Many people think that this hymn should have been our national anthem.

All the hymns written by John Greenleaf Whittier appear to be faultless. Simple, direct, and beautifully phrased, they meet all the requirements of the highest standard of hymnody, though most of them were not intended by the author to serve as hymns, but were selected from his poetical works. One of the best examples of his flawless workmanship is the poem beginning:

*The harp at Nature's advent strung
Has never ceased to play;
The song the stars of morning sung
Has never died away.*

An equally fine piece of work is the poem beginning:

*We may not climb the heavenly steep
To bring the Lord Christ down;*

The hymns of Samuel Longfellow are all of a high order, excellent in workmanship and remarkably effective in their emotional uplift. Perhaps the best examples of his work are:

*Light of ages and of nations,
Every race, and every time,
Has received thine inspirations,
Glimpses of thy truth sublime,*

and

*One holy church of God appears
Through every age and race,
Unwasted by the lapse of years,
Unchanged by changing place.*

The hymns of Frederick Lucian Hosmer are all so good that one hesitates to select an example. Perhaps it would be safe to say that one of his best hymns is:

*One thought I have, my ample creed,
So deep it is and broad,
And equal to my every need—
It is my thought of God.*

The hymn by Washington Gladden takes first rank as a true hymn:

*O Master, let me walk with thee,
In lowly paths of service free;
Tell me thy secret; help me bear
The strain of toil, the fret of care.*

The Christmas hymn by Phillips Brooks should be mentioned:

O little town of Bethlehem,

And the equally famous hymn by Edmund Hamilton Sears:

*It came upon the midnight clear,
That glorious song of old.*

One of the best contributions to the hymnody of this century is the splendid hymn written in 1903 by William De Witt Hyde, then president of Bowdoin College:

*Creation's Lord, we give thee thanks
That this thy world is incomplete;
That battle calls our marshalled ranks,
That work awaits our hands and feet.*

This is one of the great hymns of the ages, a worship song that will be sung by many coming generations.

Among living Unitarian hymn writers, John Haynes Holmes has written some vigorous and stirring hymns, of excellent workmanship, and filled with the spirit of self-sacrificing service which calls men to noble action. One of the best examples of his work is the hymn beginning:

*The voice of God is calling
Its summons unto men;
As once he spake in Zion,
So now he speaks again,
Whom shall I send to succor
My people in their need?
Whom shall I send to loosen
The bonds of shame and greed?*

There are many more excellent hymns which should be mentioned, hymns that meet all the requirements of good hymn writing, but the citation of two more will suffice to complete our illustrations. The hymn of thanksgiving and praise by John Coleman Adams is an exceptionally fine one. He begins with this stanza:

*We praise thee, God, for harvests earned,
The fruits of labor garnered in;
But praise thee more for soil unturned
From which the yield is yet to win.*

The mental pictures created by the careful wording of this hymn are exquisite. Not a word is used that detracts from the effectiveness of the phrasing. The inspirational uplift produced by this combination of strength and beauty is immediately apparent when one reads the hymn, or when it is sung by a congregation of worshipping people.

In the year 1882 George Matheson, a Scotch Presbyterian, whose eyes of flesh were blind, but whose spiritual vision was so superbly clear, wrote a hymn which, judged by the best standards of hymn writing, must be classed as very close to the perfect hymn:

*O Love that will not let me go,
I rest my weary soul in thee;
I give thee back the life I owe,
That in thine ocean depths its flow
May richer, fuller be.*

*O light that followest all my way,
I yield my flickering torch to thee;
My heart restores its borrowed ray,
That in thy sunshine's blaze its day
May brighter, fairer be.*

*O Joy that seekest me through pain,
I cannot close my heart to thee;
I trace the rainbow through the rain,
And feel the promise is not vain
That morn shall tearless be.*

*O cross that liftest up my head,
I dare not ask to fly from thee;
I lay in dust life's glory dead,
And from the ground there blossoms red
Life that shall endless be.*

This hymn, in its simplicity, strength and beauty, is such a shining example of effective worship poetry that no comment is needed. By right of its own virtue it takes its place as one of the immortal contributions to the hymnody of the world.

Judging by the general trend of modern hymn writing, the hymn writers of the future will discard altogether the anthropomorphic concept of Deity, and try to express in their hymns only the wisdom, goodness, power and beauty of the infinite Spirit of life, in whom man lives and moves and has his being, and in whom he shall find the ultimate realization of all his hopes and dreams.

Book Reviews

W. P. A. ON UNIVERSALIST HISTORY

Nearly five hundred mimeographed pages of comprehensive research and lucid summarization dealing with Universalist history are to be found in the WPA *Inventory of Universalist Archives in Massachusetts*.¹ Frankly, this reviewer expected to be bored beyond endurance by a dry as dust cataloguing of mouldering minute books and sermonic volumes fleetingly resurrected from their literary tombs. Instead of that, he found himself absorbed in a remarkably objective, well-informed and appreciative summary of Universalism in Massachusetts written by Maurice R. Wheeler. Following this initial sketch, which is balanced, critical and understanding, there came a really meaningful inventory of national and state organizations, skillfully written and carefully documented, but so executed that the flavor of strong personalities and striking incidents is retained. Names of old-time ministers are given their setting, and half-forgotten associations and conferences take on vitality and significance as the WPA writers proceed. Fragmentary information that a modern Universalist might possess about other times and other ways is built into an amazingly interesting survey.

When the reader comes to examine the detailed information about each local parish in the state (the defunct as well as the living), he realizes that he has more than a curious document in his hands; he has important church history before him. Was it not Count Keyserling who said: "Without localism, there is no culture?" The WPA writers have given immense study to the local parish and then have condensed their findings intelligently and luminously. Of course, the whole story of each local parish could not be told, but one is filled with gratitude that the task has been done as thoroughly and as compactly as it has. Anyone who writes about Universalism in Massachusetts in the future will turn to this "Inventory" as a guide book.

Professor Alfred S. Cole of Tufts College, librarian of the Universalist Historical Society, has written a foreword for the volume which vouches for the historical accuracy of the work. The co-operation between the Universalist Historical Society and the WPA research group must have enriched the historical treasures of the denominational library, for Professor Cole is warmly enthusiastic in his commendation.

The "Inventory" compels one to face the facts about the rise and the decline of Universalism. We see once more the hope and the conviction that "Universalism would sweep the country" and be "the church of tomorrow." But shifting economic conditions in certain cities killed some churches, and the acceptance of a modified Universalism in orthodox churches removed the urgency about "coming out." The age of religious

¹INVENTORY OF UNIVERSALIST ARCHIVES IN MASSACHUSETTS. Boston: Historical Records Survey, Division of Community Service Programs, Work Projects Administration, 1942. 490 pp.

controversy passed, the complexion of the religious problem changed, and Universalism was left to make its contribution as a minority movement. And that contribution was not mean or inconsiderable. The "Inventory" reveals that, too. Other denominations find themselves in the same historical situation. Their origins do not guarantee their continuance, and their good works cause us to ask what better work will they do in the future? That denominations have sufficient strength to carry on for a long time (barring emergencies) is not debatable. But to say that our present denominational pattern is the ultimate of American Protestantism is to ignore the necessities and urgencies which are piling up behind existing church organizations. It seems that re-groupings and re-alignments are inevitable. Rebels and come-outers will be gathered together in some more inclusive and comprehensive religious fellowship, and the gains of the past will be safeguarded in the liberties of the future. Then, more than ever, we shall want historical surveys like the "Inventory."

This volume on the archives of Universalism in Massachusetts is only one of a series of volumes which will treat other state denominational histories in the same vein.

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Canton, New York

MAX A. KAPP.

PROPHET OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

Professor Walter Rauschenbusch belongs among the major prophets of modern Christianity. Surely no one has more profoundly affected the course of American religious thinking than he. Here,¹ at the hands of his confidential secretary, we have not only an inspiring account of that prophet's inspiring life, but also an excellent summary of his more challenging ideas. Those who have not read *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, *Christianizing the Social Order*, and *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, may well be persuaded to do so.

In addition we have here for the first time several unpublished addresses by Prof. Rauschenbusch, including one made before the Labor Lyceum of Rochester, New York, in which a group composed entirely of socialist working-men were severely and yet fairly rebuked for their own intolerance and dogmatism, the topic being "Dogmatic and Practical Socialism." The forum period which followed was freighted with emotional peril, but the genial spirit and the good-humor of the speaker were equal to the occasion. Your reviewer enjoyed this account about as much as anything in the book.

How often a prophet's private life lends no support to his public utterances—the less we probe into his personal relationships the better. But not so with Prof. Rauschenbusch. Here the story of the messenger greatly enhances the moral challenge of the message.

The First Unitarian Congregational
Society of Rochester
Rochester, New York.

DAVID RHYS WILLIAMS.

¹WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH. By D. R. Sharpe. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 463 pp. \$2.75.